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ABSTRACT
This article describes the agents participating in the process of implementing the remuneration 
rate due to the use of water, through negotiating the global goal of reducing the contaminating 
load, in the Metropolitan Area of Valle de Aburrá (2006-2011). The exploratory analysis based 
on the inductive method permitted analyzing a case study of implementing an instrument of 
contamination control in the given region. The study concludes that characteristics of each 
of the agents are decisive to participate in the political market of electing the global goal of 
reducing the contaminating load.
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POLÍTICAS DE MERCADO Y POLÍTICAS AMBIENTALES: EL CASO DEL CONSEJO 
EN LA ELECCIÓN DEL OBJETIVO DE REDUCIR LA CARGA CONTAMINANTE 
VERTIDA EN EL RÍO MEDELLÍN EN EL PERÍODO 2006–2011
RESUMEN 
En este artículo se describen los agentes que participan en el proceso de aplicación de la 
tasa de remuneración por el uso del agua, mediante la negociación del objetivo mundial para 
reducir la carga contaminante en la Zona Metropolitana del Valle de Aburrá (2006-2011). El 
análisis exploratorio basado en el método inductivo permite realizar un estudio del caso de la 
aplicación de un instrumento de control de la contaminación en la región. El estudio llega a la 
conclusión de que las características de cada uno de los agentes son decisivas para participar 
en las políticas de mercado y elegir el objetivo mundial de reducir la carga contaminante. 
PALABRAS CLAVE:
Tasa de remuneración, mercado político, implementación de la política ambiental, la simetría 
de la información.
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POLÍTICAS DE MERCADO E POLÍTICAS AMBIENTAIS: O CASO DA CONSULTA 
PARA A ELEIÇÃO DO OBJETIVO DA REDUÇÃO DA CARGA CONTAMINANTE 
DESCARREGADOS NO RIO MEDELLÍN DURANTE O PERÍODO 2006-2011
RESUMO 
Este artigo descreve os agentes que participam do processo de implementação da taxa de 
remuneração devido à utilização da água, através da negociação a meta global de reduzir a carga 
contaminante, na Região Metropolitana de Valle de Aburrá (2006-2011). A análise exploratória 
com base no método indutivo permitido analisar um estudo de caso da implementação de um 
instrumento de controle de contaminação em uma determinada região. O estudo conclui que 
as características de cada um dos agentes são decisivas para participar no mercado político 
de eleger a meta global de reduzir a carga contaminante. 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE:
Taxa de remuneração, mercado político, a política de ambiente processo de implementação, 
a simetria de informações.
CLASSIFICAÇÃO JEL:
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INTRODUCTION
The preservation of water resource is an essential economic problem of societies. 
The problem centers on the conflict between the almost unlimited demand made 
by individuals and companies of resources and the scarce supply of such resources. 
This unbalance originates a degradation of resources as a result of the actions of 
individuals in the market. Thus, their capacity to undertake rational and reasonable 
management of those resources will impact upon the preservation and prevention 
of damage generated by their use. In Colombia, in the specific case of the hydric 
resource, Legislation (art 63, 102 of the Constitution; art 82, 82,674 and 677 of the civil 
code; art 83 of the code of human resources) indicates that water is a public good or 
belonging to the Nation and only under exceptional instances it is treated as private 
property, subjected to the restrictions or limitations imposed by the administration 
for its use. Indeed, it has been its indiscriminate use what has generated the risk of 
depletion (Salamanca, 2001, p. 36). 
The discrepancy between that which is possessed and that which is desired in 
terms of environmental quality is what gives rise to the environmental policy in a 
country (Field, 1998). This accounts for the legislation that establishes the type of 
interaction between the environment and man, and regulates their relationships. And 
the way man restricts or limits these relationships will impact upon the magnitude 
and the quality of services the environmental resources may offer man. Due to this, 
environmental policy is established to reach and maintain a desired level of quality of 
the environment. For this, governments from industrialized nations and governments 
from the Latin American nations have employed diverse elements: legal norms and 
dispositions, as well as economic instruments, which tend to improve and protect 
the environment. The enactment of said policy must answer to the rational selections 
tending to the efficient assignment of the natural resources. 
Now, the origin of this norm –which includes the hydric resource– has several 
perspectives: 1) those posing the economic analysis ignoring the political processes 
that influence on the regulation (Laffont and Tirole, 1993; Romer and Rosenthal, 
1987), processes that for Keohane, Revesz, and Stavins (1998) constitute the side of 
the supply of the regulation; 2) those examining the preferences of private industry 
for regulation and assume that the preferences of individuals prevail (Buchanan 
and Tullock, 1975), and 3) those considering a model of decisions, where resources 
can be assigned according to the pressures of interest groups competing for the 
assignation (Becker, 1983).
In Colombia, according to the Regulatory Commission on Potable Water and 
Basic Sanitation (CRA for its name in Spanish), regulation has been developed in 
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three stages. The first took place between 1995 and 1997 based on positive economy 
criteria. The second, between 1997 and 1999, was frameworked within political 
economy criteria. And the third stage was conducted from 2000 to 2001 to comply 
with the legislation (Salamanca, 2001. pp. 141-142).
As one of its environmental policies, Colombia implemented the economic 
instrument of remuneration rate. This is governed by the basic principle that those 
contaminating water must pay for the contamination they cause to this natural 
resource in the nation. The instrument is geared to modifying the contaminating 
behaviors through the incorporation, in the economic activity, of the environmental 
and social costs of the damage caused and of the costs of recovery of the resource. 
Besides, the nation adopted the remuneration rate with charges for contamination 
based on the formulations by Baumol/Oates –efficiency and equity of environmental 
quality; in spite of not obtaining the economic optimum or correcting on a total 
basis the problem of externality-, seeking to advance on decontamination through 
agreed upon measures to control dumping (Mancera and Ávila, 2004). 
Regarding the application of the rate, such generates revenue that should be 
destined to preventing, mitigating, compensating, and solving the damage caused or 
paying for the use of the resources. Nonetheless, the Regional Autonomous Corpo-
rations are in charge of managing these resources as free destination revenue, which 
generates the incentive for them to maintain or increase the collection, rather than 
discouraging the inadequate use of the resource, given that, according to article 46 
of legislation 99 of 1993, the income generated by the rates are revenue belonging 
to the regional and urban environmental authorities. 
In Colombia, two hydric quality parameters were regulated to charge for the 
remuneration rate: the biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and the total suspended 
solids (TSS). However, in Decree 1594 of 1984 another 30 contaminants were con-
sidered, but none of these has been regulated (Mancera and Ávila, 2004). This has 
impeded the application of the rate to the emissions of chemical contaminants from 
industrial activity, which are considered the principal cause of water contamination 
in the nation.
In spite of the aforementioned, the mechanism of the rate for use of water seeks 
to improve the supply of the hydric resource by stimulating rational use and funding 
of the management and administration of the resource and its waterways in each 
of the basins, to permit its preservation, regulation, and arrangement. Although 
some of the Regional Environmental Corporations are aware of this mechanism, 
they have not had an effective management to make it operative, which has not 
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permitted them to generate greater incorporation of users, or require the legalization 
of connections by illegal users. 
Additionally, the Corporations that have implemented the rate mechanism do 
not have clear control and follow up mechanisms that permit updating the data on 
property owners assigned waterways, nor do they verify that the amount granted is 
the amount used. This implies serious deficiencies in the base records that hinder 
a charge of the real consumed value.
According to Mancera and Ávila Zabala (2004) some of these Corporations have 
found that goals of decontamination are not reached in the respective jurisdiction, 
in the main because the information on the levels of BOD and TSS “was not subs-
tantiated by clear and real information”, nor were the estimations on the potential 
contamination reduction capacity of the hydrographic basins.
The consequence of everything stated above is that the regional factor has 
gradual increasement semester after semester. Among others, this is related to the 
low frequency of control and follows up by environmental authorities, the lack of 
waste water treatment systems in the municipalities, besides political negligence in 
the rate implementation process.
Also, the Constitution of 1991 strengthened the Colombian environmental policy. 
That was done via the concept of sustainable development that enabled environ-
mental and potable water sanitation to be addressed in the nation as public utilities 
in the hands of the State. Likewise, it assigned the government with functions like 
the protection of environmental diversity and integrity, promotion of environmental 
education, imposition of legal sanctions for damages caused to the environment, 
among others. The ulterior legislative development gave a judicial order to institu-
tionalism in the environmental setting. 
Legislation 99 of 1993 empowered the Ministry of the Environment to manage 
and preserve the renewable natural resources. Also, the norm granted the regional 
environmental authorities1 the faculty to exert the environmental functions of eva-
luation, control and follow up of water use, in the area of its jurisdiction. Additionally, 
the regulation suggested that whosoever discharges contaminants without exceeding 
some pre-established limits must pay a remuneration rate. 
1 Legislation 99 created the National Environmental System —SINA for its name in Spanish— which 
has the Ministry of the Environment as governing body, 33 regional autonomous and sustainable 
development corporations who manage the resources, 4 environmental administrative departments, 
5 Research Institutes as technical and scientific support, a Special Administrative Unit of the National 
Natural Parks System, the departments, municipalities and districts.
Alejandra García Cardona - Juan Carlos Arango-Quintero
74 Universidad de Medellín
The regulation of the remuneration rate functions, in effect, from Decree 901 
of 1997. On one part, the norm regulates, among others, elements like: generating 
event (direct and indirect use of water as receptor of point discharges), minimum 
tariffs, regional factors, active and passive subjects, mechanisms of collection and 
monitoring and control. In addition, upon fixing the rates, the Decree considers 
criteria like: the goal of reducing the contaminating load, recognition of regional 
diversity; availability, cost of opportunity, and capacity of resource assimilation, and 
the socioeconomic conditions of the population affected. 
Decree 3100 of 2003 repeals the previous. Although it maintains much of De-
cree 901, it adds a relevant matter on the establishment of the goal of reducing the 
contaminating load. Goal established through a consultation process, whose formal 
start will be through an administrative act of the regional environmental authorities.
In Valle de Aburrá, the consultation process for the establishment of the goal 
of reducing the contaminating load2 by point discharges onto the Medellín River 
(2006–2011), was regulated by the environmental authority, Metropolitan Area of 
Valle de Aburrá (AMVA), with resolution 000563 of 13 October 2004. The process 
of implementing the remuneration rate in the Medellín River basin started with the 
same resolution. Then, the Environmental Authority modified the process with 
resolution 000175 of March 24, 2006.
Although the analysis of the Keohane, Revensz, and Stavins (1998) model des-
cribes the different approaches —from each of the agents and their interaction in 
the political market— on the motives of the implementation of the norm to solve 
the deficiencies of the anthropogenic interventions in natural resources. Such is 
circumscribed to the space of perfect competition between supply and demand and 
only poses the possible scenarios of imperfect competition without delving into its 
logic and possible dynamics.
In this sense, the case analysis herein presented not only describes the imper-
fections of the specific political market, but advances in an approach that tries to 
explain the substantial of the imperfections. For this, each of the players from the 
2  The establishment of the global goal of reducing the contaminating load applied in Colombia was re-
gulated only for two substances subject to charge or hydric quality parameters related to charging the 
remuneration rate: biochemical oxygen demand (BOD) and total suspended solids (TSS). (Resolution 
0273 of 1997 from the Ministry of the Environment); although Decree 1594 of 1984 considers another 
30 contaminants, of which none has been regulated. This has hindered the application of the rate of 
emissions of chemical contaminants from industrial activity, which are considered the principal cause 
of water contamination in the nation.
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political market of the selection of the Global Reduction Goal was described. This 
qualifies the legitimate power conferred to the Metropolitan Area of Valle de Aburrá 
to profile it as the supply agent of the negotiation; while fine tuning the relevance 
of the contamination discharged by each direct user of the Medellín River, to justify 
to the regulated community as the demand parties of the market under analysis. 
1. METHOD
Stemming from inductive method of qualitative research, the political scenario 
created for selection of the global goal of reducing the contaminating load is studied, 
during the 2006-2011 period, to decontaminate the hydrographic basin of Valle 
de Aburrá. The exploratory analysis presents a case study, the real experience of 
implementing an environmental policy in a given region.
For the aforementioned, the documentary evaluation of 15 proceedings elabo-
rated during the meetings between the negotiators of the global goal of reducing 
the contaminating load, permitted identifying the agents who participated in the 
consultation board. Thereafter, these were interviewed on the consultation pro-
cess. After conducting the interviews, these were transcribed. Then, the traditional 
supply and demand model and elements of microeconomic theory facilitated the 
description of the behavior of each of the players based on the information from 
the proceedings and the information from the interviews.
2. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The results allude to the characterization of the two agents of the political market 
(supply and demand) within the context of the Consultation board. In the first place, 
it is introduced the traits of the supply, in this instance the AMVA; in the second 
place, it is shown that the corresponding to the demand (polluters of the Medellín 
River), represented by the regulated community. 
2.1 The supplier
The AMVA, based on its jurisdiction, delineated the product and established its 
target demand. For such, it proceeded through three steps: 1) identification of the 
agents of the regulated community and the respective jurisdiction with respect 
to the Medellín River; 2) the selection of said community and the definition of the 
guidelines to convoke it to the negotiation given the jurisdiction; and 3) the design 
of the product denominated global goal of reducing the contaminating load (MGRCC 
for its name in Spanish). Hereinafter, details of each will be offered.
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2.1.1 Identification of the agents of the regulated community and of the respective 
jurisdiction
The AMVA is the competent environmental authority to establish the supply of the 
goals of reducing the contaminating loads of the two components discharged in 
sections two and three of the Medellín River and its tributaries, the Biochemical 
Oxygen Demand (BOD5) and the Total Suspended Solids (TSS). Both sections im-
ply the exercise of authority of said entity like identification of demanding parties 
settled in the concrete geographic portion. To divide the river into sections with the 
corresponding area covered, the environmental authority considered three aspects: 
the amount of information provided by the agents who discharge in the section (self 
declarations), the water quality, and works to be conducted. 
The first section (T1) comprises a rural sector in the jurisdiction of the Regional 
Autonomous Corporation of Central Antioquia —CORANTIOQUIA3 —; the second 
encompasses the urban area among the cities of Caldas, La Estrella, Sabaneta, 
Itagüí, Medellín, and Bello; and the third includes the municipalities of Copacabana, 
Girardota, and Barbosa. Given that the last two sections were jurisdiction of AMVA, 
a decision was taken on these regarding the objective goal of specific loads; hence, 
section one was not subject to decision. Also, AMVA considered three criteria: 
the amount of information provided by the agents discharging in the section (self 
declarations), water quality and infrastructure work to be conducted. Sections two 
(T2) and three (T3), will not only permit the exercise of the environmental authority 
upon the players who contaminate, but they will also facilitate identifying them given 
that they were settled in the concrete geographic portion. Additionally, said division, 
as suggested by AMVA (2006), was “an adequate manner of showing results joined 
to actions and having the user in mind” (p. 5). This is fundamental when suppliers 
segment their market goal under geographic criteria. And most of all when a political 
player exerting power over another to guarantee diminished contamination of a 
public good like the Medellín River.
Upon identifying the respective jurisdiction, the AMVA – as competent envi-
ronmental authority – established the offer from the corresponding global goal of 
reducing the contaminating load according to the two components discharged in 
3  Legislation 99 of 1993 which instituted in Colombia the Ministry of the Environment and reorganized 
the public sector for management and preservation of such and its renewable natural resources set 
the articulation of a National Environmental System. This system integrates territorial environmental 
authorities or autonomous corporations (CAR), the Colombian National System of Protected Areas 
(SINAP for its name in Spanish) and the Regional System of Protected Areas (SIRAP for its name in 
Spanish). The Regional Autonomous Corporation of Central Antioquia (CORANTIOQUIA) is one of the 
26 corporations in existence. Its jurisdiction comprises 80 municipalities from central Antioquia and 
it is inhabited by 3,200,000 individuals.
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T2 and T3 of the Medellín River and its tributaries: the biochemical oxygen demand 
(BOD5) and the total suspended solids (TSS). Given its jurisdiction, the environmental 
authority decided on the objective goal of reducing specific loads in both sections 
(Table 1). This decision implied user participation of the river in the definition of the 
regulating instrument under the form of the information provided with respect to 
its levels of contamination loads. 
Table 1. Target load discharge with reduction year 2011 in Tons/year
Parameter Sector Section 2 Section 3
BOD5
EPM – Significant Industrial Sector
EPM – Domestic Sector
Individual – Sector Goal (EPM Subtotal)
Sector Goal – Load users not connected to 
EPM
Global Goal – Total Load
12,870.10
38,937.85
51,807.95
 1299.04
53,106.99
1442.19
1184.44
2626.63
1321.93
3948.56
TSS
EPM – Significant Industrial Sector
EPM – Domestic Sector
Individual – Sector Goal (EPM Subtotal)
Sector Goal – Load users not connected to 
EPM
Global Goal – Total Load
 3656.30
28,603.17
32,259.47
 1792.01
34,051.48
 50.04
 816.30
 866.34
 1183.82
 2050.16
Source: AMVA (2006)
2.1.2 Selection of the demand and criteria for its call given the jurisdiction
The AMVA selected the demand through a call to sectors generating discharges of 
waste waters. Those invited were the public service provider company, connected 
and unconnected industries4. Likewise, the invitation was also extended to control 
organisms like the National Prosecutor’s Office (Procuraduría General de la Nación), the 
Comptroller of the city of Medellín, and the municipal legal representations, as well as 
the mayors of the municipalities from the jurisdiction area, representatives from the 
academic sector and some environmental NGOs. Given the technical nature of the 
environmental issue, the AMVA concern revolved around qualifying the information 
offered to each of the players invited.
4  Names of companies from the industrial sector will be mentioned in the section of demand 
characterization.
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The AMVA tried to solve the problem of information asymmetry on the remu-
neration rate and its operation by segmenting the distinct agents. The procedure 
was carried out through meetings with each of them to make them aware and then 
attract them to the consultation board. Once this was accomplished, more qualified 
participation was possible from the different protagonists from the political market 
in selecting the MGRCC. 
2.1.3 The product design
Speaking of a market implies mentioning a product. In the specific case of the 
consultation board, the product to be negotiated among the agents from the poli-
tical market was the remuneration rate and its gradual implementation through the 
MGRCC. The MGRCC is characterized for being a product composed of the sum of 
the individual and sector goals. Each corresponds to a demand or user of the hydric 
resource. What is interesting about the product is that it implied the commitment of 
the demand players to reduce during one year the BOD5 and TSS discharges in the 
respective section and in a determined percentage. This depended upon whether the 
users discharged or not onto the sewage system of Empresas Públicas de Medellín (EPM). 
For the product offered in the market to be in effect that demanded there 
must be a need to satisfy. In this study case, to create the need for the MGRCC, it 
was fundamental for the AMVA to consider a normative reference. For this, both 
agents, supplier and demand players, parted from an “initial reference framework or 
ZERO STATE, against which the goals of reducing future load must be negotiated 
and which will serve as reference to establish the tendencies of the contaminating 
phenomenon under discussion” (AMVA, 2006, p. 5) (upper case letters are from the 
original). The zero state alludes to the river conditions before the negotiation; addi-
tionally, it determines – during a given moment – which are the loads discharged 
onto the body of water, identifies who discharges them, and its recovery capacity 
in the contaminated section. 
The aforementioned implied the existence of a “Base Line of Contamination by 
Liquid Discharges” (AMVA, 2006, p. 5). Said line justified the MGRCC; additionally, 
it described the state and availability of the resource based on the characterization 
of the discharges and on the self declarations by demanding parties on their se-
mester and/or loads per year. In all, the process of creating the need for the product 
contained three steps: 1) identification of amounts of BOD5 and TSS discharged by 
the river users in the respective section; 2) aggregation of the loads in each section; 
and 3) five-year projection of the loads from each demanding party according to 
variation indexes in the discharges. 
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Besides the MGRCC, the supplier provided two more products to control waste 
waters and decontaminate the hydric resource, such as: regulating and facilitating 
instruments. The first, of two types: economic like the remuneration rate, and 
command and control. Both are obligatory for all users contaminating the river. 
The latter, the facilitators, voluntary agreements or covenants the demand parties 
put into operation to reduce contamination and rational use of the available water. 
The regulating instruments, given their legal nature, are binding for those involved; 
thereby, requiring negotiation. This is not the case with facilitating instruments 
because their object is the sectorial and entrepreneurial competitiveness and not 
compliance with a policy, despite its link with an environmental policy.
2.2  The demand parties
Based on segmentation, two groups emerged from the regulated community: the 
sewage system provider entities with a load over 20% discharged onto the water 
source and other users of the hydric resource. 
The following are specific features of both.
2.2.1 Entity in charge of providing public sewage system services in Valle de Aburrá
One of the most important demand parties in the political market of the MGRCC 
Consultation board was EPM. This entity’s importance lied in that it managed more 
than 80% of the discharge generated by the population in the Metropolitan Area 
of Medellín. The figure is nothing more than the reflection of an entrepreneurial 
history dating over 100 years, marked by three significant events (EPM, 2005): 1) the 
organization of the sewage service as an economic activity in 1888; 2) transferring 
the service from private parties to the municipality in 1955; 3) the normative changes 
of 1994. This last aspect implied two important issues. First, the new conception of 
the household sewage public service5; and second, the character acquired by the 
service provider, which due to norm requirements had to be a State-run commercial 
or industrial company or shareholder societies.
Specifically, fee of the remuneration rate remains if the goals of decontamination 
are reached, otherwise the regional factor is increased and thus the rate to be paid 
for the fee. In other words, the regional factor determines pollution reduction in 
order to achieve the preset level of decontamination. 
5  Defined by legislation 142 of 1994 (art. 14, numeral 23) as: “the municipal collection of wastes, mainly 
liquids, through pipelines and conduits”. The legislation also applies to complementary activities: 
transport, treatment, and final disposal of wastes.
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Because of this, EPM has managed for over 50 years the transport, treatment, 
and final disposal of BOD5 and TSS discharges. This turned the Entity into the largest 
cause of contamination of the Medellín River, given that it is responsible for point 
source discharges. Consequently, because of the company’s economic activity, it 
does not perceive the river as a hydric resource, but as a channel where it deposits 
the discharges (Osorio, 2008). The main reason for this perspective lies in the costs 
that would be implied for users of the sewage system to have a healthy resource. In 
this regard, Osorio (2008) states: “[we must ask] society at large what type of river it 
wants to see how much it is willing to invest, how much it is willing to pay. Then, if 
there were a different context of degree of development, degree of revenue, standard 
of living it is possible to have a better view of the quality of the river” (sic). According 
to the affirmation, it is necessary to say that maintaining the quality of a natural 
resource depends upon the community’s willingness on a large basis to pay, which 
is determined by the level of awareness of its citizens. 
Considering the river as a simple dump implied that EPM demanded from AMVA 
an individual goal of reducing the contaminating load (MIRCC for the term in Spanish). 
The MIRCC worked for the Company as a way of “limiting the coercive power” (Stigler, 
1971, p. 4)6 of the environmental authority. In keeping to the Colombian normative 
framework, EPM complied with that strict required by the “Colombian legal disposition 
to guarantee quality of the river” (Osorio, 2008), and kept it to the permitted level of 
regulated substances. Had it been possible to carry out other activities for sanitation 
of the resource, without doubt, the Entity would have done so, as long as it did not 
affect on a significant basis its costs. 
The important role performed by EPM justified its presence in the Consultation 
Board. The administration of 92% of the discharges (AMVA, 2006, p. 40) given the 
development of the economic activity complementary to that of sewage, led to the 
“(…) express citation of the environmental authority, in this instance the Metropolitan Area” 
(Osorio, 2008). Thus, EPM consolidated the nature of large user of the river, naming 
two representatives to answer the AMVA call.
2.2.2 Other users of the hydric resource
The other users of the hydric resource —second division of the regulated community 
established by the norm and because of such second demand party of the legislative 
product— had two characteristics. First, the regulated community attended the 
Roundtable in response to the call from the environmental authority, and in repre-
sentation of the industries located along the Metropolitan Area of Valle de Aburrá. 
6  It is the term used by Economic Regulation Theory to justify the demand for environmental regulation. 
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Second, it was a sector not connected to the EPM sewage network, and by virtue 
of this, it constituted less than 10% of the direct discharge onto the Medellín River. 
Let us have a detailed look at both features.
2.2.2.1 Location and representation of the agents in the market
The representatives from the industrial sector considered that the fact of being or 
not connected to the EPM network was not a strong argument to conceive the river 
as a hydric resource, given that they continued to consider it as a dump site for the 
sub-products of their economic activity. Given that the sectorial goal of reducing the 
contaminating load (MSRCC for the term in Spanish) was applicable to users subjected 
to paying the remuneration rate, the companies had to commit to said goal. The 
commitment implied internalizing the contamination in production costs, with the 
usual effect that these could increase. At this precise moment when non-compliance 
with the reduction of discharges by a user would affect all the companies located 
along the banks of the Medellín River. This was because the MSRCC applied to the 
whole business sector, which could have an adverse affect on the sectorial interests. 
To sum up, the value of the return rate will be kept only if the goals are achieved. 
In case the goals are not achieved the regional factor will increase which will in turn 
increase the cost regarding the rate. In other words, the regional factor is the one 
that determines the reduction in contamination until reaching the prestablished 
level to reach the goal.
Given the aforementioned, the industrialists consolidated their interests in the 
Board expressed in a posture agglutinated around the river issue. They saw the 
hydric resource from the regional as a whole. However, the environmental authority 
conceived it in fractioned manner, and so sought to discuss it during the consultation 
instance, in spite of the noise this generated during the negotiation of the goal. Upon 
considering it in fragmented manner, the factories located to the south of Medellín, 
near the San Fernando treatment plant, would suggest that the EPM Sanitation Plan 
implied in fact decontamination by them. While companies from the north would 
argue unequal conditions, given that they did not have a sewage plan7 (Giraldo, 
2008). In all, the speakers for the industrialists sat at the Board in representation of 
a sector not differentiated in terms of the location by sections.
7  Given the geographic location, the discharge of waste water from companies could be classified from 
north to south of Valle de Aburrá into three groups: a) those from the south discharged into the sewage 
system and then treated at the San Fernando Plant; b) those from the center–north gathered by the 
EPM system, but with expectation of treatment in the future Plant in Bello; c) those discharged or not 
discharged onto the EPM sewage system, but located after the future Plant in Bello. 
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The previous alludes to the solidarity of the connected industrial parties with 
not connected, regarding discharges (AMVA, 2006, p. 4). Solidarity perceived in 
the sense of sharing among them the responsibility for the contamination. This is 
covered by the norm, given that “the Political Constitution carries a concurrent duty 
from the State and from individuals, to protect the natural resources. It may not be 
said that it is an exclusive obligation of the State because [each individual] is also 
responsible for the preservation of the natural resources (…). Then, under that pers-
pective, when saying that solidarity exists, meaning a concurrence in the obligation of the 
State and the individual, of the authority, of the provider and of the user; all fit therein.” (Osorio, 
2008) (Italics included by the authors). In other words, the role of the sector in the 
sanitation of the hydric resource was conceived as something that complements, 
from its responsibility in principle and effect, all the other social players.
Regarding the representation of the industrialists in the consultation board, three 
important arguments coexist: representativeness, participation, and experience. The 
following delves into these elements. 
The first alludes to the ANDI participation in the scenario of the political market, 
speaking in representation of a conglomerate of sectors and trade groups at the 
national setting. In other words, “within their primary quality as speakers for the interests of 
private enterprise, the ANDI assumes the representation of its affiliates with national and foreign 
entities dealing with economic, judicial, social, environmental issues and other entrepreneurial 
matters” (ANDI, 2008); turning representation into a factor that confers preponderance 
to the trade group, within the different players on the Board.
The second argument, representation of users not interconnected to the EPM 
network alludes to direct participation in the Consultation Board by four of the 
companies from Valle de Aburrá: Enka de Colombia S.A., Papelsa S.A., Conquímica, 
and Fabricato–Tejicóndor; all of which AMVA, according to Giraldo (2008), convoked 
because they “had a greater load.” However, the Proposal document, reproduced by 
the representatives, mentions some specifics that could help to understand the 
presence of the participants. For example, Textiles Fabricato-Tejicóndor, on the 
moment of negotiation, had invested an unspecified sum in the document, in the 
separation of sewage and in the construction of collectors to communicate them 
to those owned by EPM. The Papelsa S.A. property line coincided with the terrain 
ending sector three of the Medellín River. That is, in this company was where the 
AMVA river jurisdiction ended (Berger et al., 2006, p. 11).
The third argument is the experience of the companies in the environmental area, 
which permitted the same degree of information about the issue of discharges and, 
hence, about the remuneration rates. The generation of this symmetry of information 
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resulted in flawless communication among negotiators participating on the Board. 
In this regard, speakers for industry from the south and center (ANDI) of Valle de 
Aburrá convene in their appreciations. Restrepo (2008) states that “Conquímica S.A. 
affiliated to the South Aburrá Chamber of Commerce, arrived to the Consultation Board by express 
invitation from the director of said Chamber, in echo of AMVA; given the Company’s experience 
in environmental themes”. Also, Giraldo (2008) holds that “AMVA knows where there are 
industries people (sic) [trained to have] the level of interlocution and [continuity of such].” 
Giraldo (2008) also associates said characteristic to the size of the company and to 
the discharges it generates.
2.2.2.2 Representativeness of agents in the market
Related to the second and last feature of the sector not connected, there is the 
event generating the remuneration rate. That is, it is a sector that is legitimated as a 
demand party of the goal in the Consultation Board by generating direct discharges 
onto the hydric resource of the Metropolitan Area. This agent, as a company that 
provides public services, aggregates the industrial and domestic sectors. In terms of 
contamination, they contribute 4.9% of BOD5 and 7.2% TSS, concerning the industrial 
sector, while the residential participated with 2.1% of BOD5 and 2.3% TSS (Berger et 
al., 2006, p. 8). Additionally, this was a sector not connected that included 25,000 
households from the municipality of Caldas to that of Barbosa, a minimum amount 
compared to 3-million inhabitants in Valle de Aburrá (Cardona, 2008; AMVA, 2006).
Because over 90% of the discharge from Valle de Aburrá is managed by the 
entity providing the sewage public service in the zone, and in keeping with its 
economic activity, legislation authorized it to transfer to its clients the value of the 
remuneration rate for the waste waters. Instead, the other users of the resource are 
direct generators of the event that originates the rate: they discharge punctually, 
for which they must show reductions of the load received by the hydric resource. If 
this were not so, they would have an increase factor in said rate, which would make 
conditions different for this sector; given that it implied an increase in costs for each 
of the users (Osorio, 2008)
This could be summarized in that the other users discharged onto the Medellín 
River, for which they bore the direct value of the political instrument. Discharges 
that in terms of contamination do not imply high loads, but in terms of that taxed, 
lead to great efforts from each of the companies involved with the event generating 
the Remuneration Rate. The plausible explanation is that the companies belonging 
to this group had to commit to implementing cleaner production systems to comply 
with an MSRCC, or because the sector did not comply with such and; consequently, 
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it was subject to its increased value. In both cases, decontamination or contamina-
tion, the cost was internalized with the consequences that were already mentioned.
In general terms, the motives leading to the second division of the regulated 
community to require the MSRCC product in the Consultation board were: the 
distribution of the sector not connected in sections two and three; the ANDI re-
presentative quality as a trade group; the participation of four companies —two 
with particular characteristics—; their experience in the environmental setting; and 
the representativeness of the contamination discharged onto the hydric resource. 
The goal applying to the industrial and domestic part disconnected from the EPM 
sewage system.
It is worth noting that in the Consultation board “two proposals were introduced, 
one by Empresas Públicas de Medellín, and another by industrialists participating in the 
Consultation board” (AMVA, 2006, p. 6). Hence, there were two products required by 
the respective agents in this political market of the MGRCC consultation: a legislative 
product denominated MIRCC and another also normative product called MSRCC. 
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the representation of the demand parties  
in the Consultation Board 
Source: Authors´ elaboration based on Berger et al (2006)
Figure 1. The Consultation board was attended by industries connected and not 
connected to the EPM sewage network. EPM represented the first. The latter had 
delegates from specific companies like Enka de Colombia S.A., Papelsa S.A., Con-
química, and Fabricato-Tejicondor. Simultaneously, the trade groups were backed by 
the Colombian National Association of Entrepreneurs (ANDI for its name in Spanish) 
and the Colombian Association of Micro, Small, and Medium Companies (ACOPI 
for its name in Spanish), who represented industries and companies connected and 
not connected. 
Usuarios de la red de alcantarillado de EE. PP. MM.
Usuarios conectados Usuarios desconectados
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Zona Norte Zona Centro Zona CentroZona Sur Todas las zonas
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3. CONCLUSIONS
Each of the agents intervening in the decision of the goals of reducing the contamina-
ting loads on the hydrographic basin of Valle de Aburrá have specific characteristics, 
which are decisive to participate in the political market of the selection of such 
goals. On one side, there is the supplier AMVA, who legitimates its environmental 
authority functions and creates the need for the legislative product on the demand 
parties by identifying them and convoking them to the Consultation board; given 
the assignment of the demand to the Entity jurisdiction. Also, there are two demand 
parties: the company transporting, treating, and disposing of wastewater from Valle 
de Aburrá and the rest of the users of the resource. The first is responsible for the 
greatest part of the direct discharges onto the hydric resource during the develop-
ment of the public service; the second demand party gathers all the industry from 
the Metropolitan Area, those not connected to the city’s sewage system in particular. 
Consequently, the AMVA regulated community, in the furtherance of its respective 
economic activities, attends the Board because of two fundamental reasons: the 
concomitant traits they have for the supplier, regarding the complementary nature 
of the discharges perceived by the Medellín River; and to solve for the Authority the 
asymmetry of the information it has on the contamination dumped onto the river.
For the 2012-2016 period, a new negotiation board will be convoked with the 
contaminating agents. Therefore, it is proposed to study this new consultation 
process of the global goal of reducing the contaminating load for the 2012-2016 
period of which it would be expected greater enforceability in decontaminating the 
Medellín River.
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